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I.  Introduction
Crime has been one of the major problems ofcivilization from the beginning, and its magnitude has increased over time.  In the political
arena, public policy regarding crime prevention has
long been a hotly debated issue.  In 1999, federal,
state, and local governments combined to spend over
$146 billion or approximately $521 per citizen on
crime prevention and control (USDOJ, BJS, 2001).
One source estimates the private sector expenditure
on protection to be 73% higher than public expendi-
ture (Freeman, 1999).  Considering the enormous
effort put toward extinguishing crime, it is amazing
how little the crime industry has
changed in contemporary his-
tory.
These statistics illus-
trate the expenditure on crime
prevention and control; how-
ever, they do not include the
cost of the crimes that are not
prevented.  For example, in 2000 the value of motor
vehicles stolen was estimated at $7.8 billion (this fol-
lows a decade long decrease in the motor vehicle theft
rate) (USDOJ, FBI, 2001).  Some experts consider
this a transfer of wealth rather than a cost to society;
however it does come at a premium to society as
seen by the amount spent on crime control.  This pa-
per explores the relationship between motor vehicle
theft and unemployment.
Economists traditionally use the unemploy-
ment rate as an indicator of the amount of legitimate
employment opportunities available to individuals.
Therefore, a high unemployment rate suggests that
there are fewer employment opportunities available
and thus the opportunity cost of choosing crime over
legitimate work is low (Becker, 1968, Cornwell and
Trumbull, 1994, Ehrlich, 1996, Myers, 1983, and
Witte, 1980).  However, sociologists look at the un-
employment rate as being an indicator of the “supply
of suitable victims” as well as the traditional economic
perspective (Britt, 1994 and Cantor and Land, 1985).
They suggest that as the unemployment rate increases
there is a proportional decrease in the supply of suit-
able victims because people have less to steal.  This
occurs because as unemployment increases there are
fewer cars on the road.  This paper examines the re-
lationship between motor vehicle theft and unemploy-
ment at the state level in an attempt to understand
which perspective has the overriding effect.
The rest of the paper explores
whether there is a significant re-
lationship between economic
conditions and motor vehicle
theft.  Section II will discuss the
literature that is important in de-
veloping an economic model of
crime and the relationship be-
tween unemployment and crime.  Also in Section II, I
will expound upon a theoretical model that is partially
taken from the previous literature.  This theory leads
to Section III, which establishes my empirical model
and explains the variables that are important to my
theory. Finally, in Section IV, I will present the results
of my regression analysis on the relationship between
unemployment and the motor vehicle theft rate.
II. Background and Theory
Historically, there have been two major
schools of thought regarding the unemployment-crime
relationship, the first school focuses on the “supply of
offenders” while the second school focuses on the
“supply of victims.”  Economists have traditionally
focused on explaining the economic behavior of po-
“Considering the enormous ef-
fort put toward extinguishing crime,
it is amazing how little the crime in-
dustry has changed in contemporary
history.”
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tential offenders and the way they react to changes in
economic conditions.  One basic notion is that in or-
der for an individual to maintain a certain standard of
living during a period of unemployment he/she will
become more likely to commit a criminal act.  How-
ever, after being unable to fully substantiate their hy-
pothesis that a positive relationship should exist be-
tween unemployment and crime a new school of
thought developed.  Sociologists and criminologists
have recently begun studying how unemployment af-
fects the supply of suitable victims.  Higher unem-
ployment rate is correlated with a wider decrease in
production and consumption; therefore there is less
new merchandise in the “market” to be stolen.  As
Cantor and Land (1985) note, a crime requires not
just the supply of a motivated offender but also a suit-
able target.  The following is a review of major points
that are required to develop a full structural model of
the unemployment-crime relationship.
Since Becker (1968), there have been nu-
merous contributors to the study of the relationship
between economics and crime.  Becker’s leading
theory shows the decision making process of poten-
tial criminals.  Becker uses a simple cost-benefit analy-
sis in which criminals make their decisions by consid-
ering the benefit of committing a crime and subtract-
ing from that the probability of being caught multi-
plied by the severity of punishment if caught.  Becker
argues that potential criminals establish a baseline from
their individual risk preferences that helps them de-
cide whether or not they will commit a certain crime.
Ehrlich’s (1996) “market model” of crime is based
on the model created by Becker (1968) and a few
key assumptions: (1) all actors (criminals, victims,
“buyers” of crime, and law enforcement) behave in
an optimizing behavior, (2) there are certain general
expectations about illegitimate work, including pun-
ishment, and (3) there is a distribution of risk prefer-
ences.  From these main theoretical assumptions
Ehrlich builds his theory on the “supply of offenses.”
The model reads as follows, net return per offense
equals expected payoff minus direct costs of activity
minus foregone wages from legitimate activity minus
the probability of conviction multiplied by the severity
of punishment.  It can be summarized as net return =
payoff-cost – legit wage – (probability convict x pun-
ishment).  In the model, expected payoff refers to the
nominal financial gain from the activity.  The direct
costs are the monetary amount that the criminal puts
toward preparing and completing the activity.  Fore-
gone wages are the opportunity cost of choosing ille-
gitimate work over legitimate work.  Therefore, if the
theory is correct the net return per offense must ex-
ceed some level before the individual will undertake
it, depending on each person’s risk preference.  Some
individuals may gain more utility from work in illegal
areas than legal areas, so the point where these indi-
viduals turn to crime is lower.  Other individuals may
experience a disutility resulting from the illegal activ-
ity.  These individuals would typically demand a higher
net return before getting involved in crime.  Ehrlich’s
(1996) theoretical model for the supply of illegitimate
activity has been used in research numerous times over
the years.
Britt (1994) lays out a theory that has been
developed from a more sociologically critical point of
view.  The two theories that he focuses on are very
important in explaining the relationship between crime
and unemployment.  The two theories are the moti-
vational perspective and the opportunity perspective.
The motivational perspective is the intuitive theory that
economists expect to exist in the relationship between
unemployment and crime.  Its premise is that a posi-
tive relationship exists between crime rates and un-
employment rates.  As he explains, this could exist for
a number of reasons, but mainly because as the eco-
nomic condition deteriorates people are motivated to
resort to crime as a source of income.
The second notion is the opportunity perspec-
tive, which “sees crime as a supply of potential of-
fenders and suitable victims.”  During rough economic
periods people and places become less suitable vic-
tims because they themselves do not have money or
excess material goods and also because personal
property is more guarded.  Therefore, a negative re-
lationship between economic circumstances and crime
should exist.  Britt’s results show that the opportunity
perspective has the dominant effect across crimesi.
My first hypothesis is that the opportunity ef-
fect will outweigh the motivational effect in the present
with regards to motor vehicle theft.  This means that
there will be a negative relationship between existing
unemployment rates and motor vehicle theft rates.
When unemployment is at higher levels and economic
conditions are poor there are fewer opportunities to
1 Britt’s model includes homicide, rape, aggravated assault, rob-
bery, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft.  He discovers the
opportunity effect to be significant for each of the crimes at the
national level with the exception of motor vehicle theft, which had
a negative sign but was not statistically significant.
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commit property crimes.  A possible explanation is
that the current unemployment rate determines how
many people and much property is circulating in soci-
ety.  If unemployment is high people are not going to
spend as much, so there will be fewer new cars on
the streets.  In fact, people are less likely to leave
home if unemployment is high because by staying home
they save money.
Britt (1994), as well as Cantor and Land
(1985) suggest that a motivational effect exists be-
tween changes in unemployment and the crime rate.
In theory it should exist because as more people be-
come unemployed they may not be familiar with han-
dling the economic discomfort.  Also, as people be-
come unemployed for an extended period they con-
sider the opportunity cost of choosing illegitimate work
as being zero because he/she is not sacrificing any
legitimate employment opportunity.  For both of these
individuals the payoff from the crime does not have to
be as high as it would for an individual who would
consider the opportunity cost to be positive.  Britt
also suggests a psychological factor that relates to
being unemployed for an extended period and an in-
dividual disposition toward criminal behavior.  He
suggests that people become irrational economic ac-
tors and disgruntled citizens.  So these individuals are
willing to undertake more illegitimate opportunities
than an employed individual or a person who is in
unemployment for only a short period of time.  There-
fore, my second hypothesis is that the motivational
effect dominates the opportunity effect and that there
is a positive relationship between the change in the
unemployment rate and the motor vehicle theft rate.
III. Empirical Model
A.  Data
In order to capture the relationship between
motor vehicle theft and unemployment over the past
quarter century I develop a model that is similar to
the model that Britt (1994) uses.  The model will be
tested using cross-sectional time series data from ten
different states within the United States over the past
twenty years.  The states were selected to create a
stratified sample based on population density, since
more populous states historically have a higher crime
rate (USDOJ, BJS, 2001).  The sample contains ten
states ranging from the most densely populated to the
forty-sixth most densely populated state based on the
2000 United States Census.
The dependent variable is the motor vehicle
theft rate (MVTR) as reported by the FBI (1979-
2001) since 1979.  The motor vehicle theft rate is
defined as the number of vehicles stolen per 100,000
inhabitantsii.   Over the past quarter century the rate
 
 
Figure 1: National Auto Theft Trend - 1979-2000 
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has fluctuated greatly, culminating in a continuous de-
crease over the past ten years, as shown in Figure 1.
There are two main reasons that motor ve-
hicle theft is chosen as the focus of this study over
other crimes.  The first reason is that past research
has been criticized for attempting to bring murderers
and rapists into a model that is best suited for rational
actors.  However, while it is hard to argue that mur-
derers and rapists are in fact rational, it is much easier
to consider a property thief an economically rational
actor.  Individuals that steal normally do so for some
monetary gain.  The second reason is that motor ve-
hicle thefts are among the highest reported crimes due
to insurance reasons (Freeman, 1999).  Other prop-
erty crimes often go unreported because people feel
that reporting the incident to the police will not benefit
them in any way.
The primary independent variable that is in-
tegrated into the model is the unemployment rate
(UNEMP).  The data for unemployment comes from
the United States Department of Labor, Bureau of
Labor Statistics.  As noted in Section II, the unem-
ployment rate is used by economists to show how
potential criminals respond to the opportunity cost of
legitimate work as it is labeled in Ehrlich (1996).  Its
primary purpose here, however, is to show whether
the unemployment rate is an accurate measure of
Ehrlich’s opportunity cost or does the unemployment
rate help explain that the supply of victims has de-
creased.  If, as my hypothesis suggests, the opportu-
nity perspective has the dominant effect on the motor
vehicle theft rate then there will be a negative rela-
tionship between unemployment and the motor ve-
hicle theft rate.
The second independent variable is the change
in unemployment from year to year (DUNEMP) as
reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  This is
important to the model because it helps capture the
motivational perspective.  For example, if in year five
the unemployment rate is three percent and in year
six the unemployment rate increases to four percent
people are going to look upon the situation as nega-
tive because more people are out of work even though
in the historical perspective four percent is better than
average.  Therefore, this negative outlook could mo-
tivate some to commit crimes, even though the unem-
ployment rate is still rather good in historical terms.
Without the change variable though this higher theft
rate matched with low unemployment would point to
the opportunity perspective rather than the motiva-
tion perspective.
The last set of variables that make up the
models are the variables for the states (NJ, NY, GA,
MN, WI, MS, AZ, UT, SD).  While serving as dummy
variables these variables also help catch factors that
are not explained in my model.  They can be called
fixed effect variables because they capture everything
that is unique to the state.  In theory, the more popu-
lous states should have a higher motor vehicle theft
rate than the less populous states; therefore the coef-
ficient should be greater for a state such as New Jer-
sey or New York than for Utah or South Dakota.
B. Models
The object of this paper is to build on the
empirical models laid out by Britt (1994) that finds no
significant relationship between the current unemploy-
ment rate and the amount of motor vehicle thefts on
the national level.  Britt also finds a significant but theo-
retically backwards relationship between the change
in unemployment and motor vehicle thefts on the na-
tional level.  The first model uses state level data to
create a relationship between unemployment, the
change in unemployment, and motor vehicle theft that
the aggregate data is unable to establish.
(Eq. 1)
MVTR=ß1 + ß2UNEMP + ß3DUNEMP + ß4NJ
+ ß5NY + ß6GA + …  + ß12SD + u
The second model will include a time trend compo-
nent in addition to the first model in an attempt to help
explain patterns over time.
(Eq. 2)
MVTR=ß1 + ß2UNEMP + ß3DUNEMP + ß4NJ
+ ß5NY + ß6GA + …  + ß12SD + ß131980
+ ß141981 + ß151982 + ß332000 + u
IV. Results
The statistically insignificant results of the na-
tional level analysis show a need to adjust the unit of
observation.  The best unit of observation for the pur-
poses of this study is the state level.  Each state has its
own characteristics that make it unique from the oth-
ii The manner in which this statistic is reported creates a relation-
ship between time and MVTR because motor vehicle ownership
rates change over time.  In 1977 there were .76 vehicles per per-
son over 16 years of age and grew to .90 vehicles per person over
16 years of age in 1990 (USDOT, BTS 2000).
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ers.  Within the state, patterns of unemployment and
motor vehicle theft are typically homogenous.  There-
fore, my first model addresses the same unemploy-
ment-crime relationship like the past research, but
brings it down to the state level.  Table 1 shows the
results of the first model, which are indeed much more
significant.
Unlike the analysis in the aggregate models,
Table 1 shows that both unemployment and the change
in unemployment are highly significant when measured
at the state level.  The constant in the equation refers
to the base motor vehicle theft rate in Illinois, which
was the state not assigned a dummy variable, under
the condition of zero unemployment and no change in
the unemployment rate.  The coefficient for each state
refers to that states standard deviation from Illinois’
motor vehicle theft rate, for example New Jersey had
a coefficient of 95.348, which means that its standard
motor vehicle theft would be 821.6, or 95.348 higher
than Illinois’.  The pattern of state coefficients that is
suggested in the theory, more densely populated states
have higher incidences of crime, holds nearly entirely
true.  However, there may also be other factors that
determine a state’s motor vehicle theft rate.  One ad-
ditional possibility is the motor vehicle ownership rate.
After the fixed effects of each state have been
taken into account the effects that the unemployment
rate (UNEMP) and change in the unemployment rate
(DUNEMP) have across the states in the model are
highly significant.  Unemployment has a highly statisti-
cally significant relationship with the motor vehicle theft
rate (MVTR).  The results of the model suggest that
for each percentage point increase in unemployment
there will be approximately twenty-two fewer stolen
vehicles per 100,000 inhabitants.  Therefore the un-
employment rate has the significant negative relation-
ship that my hypothesis proposes.  This suggests that
the opportunity perspective outweighs the motivational
perspective in the present.
The second independent variable, the change
in the unemployment rate (DUNEMP), also has a sta-
tistically significant relationship with the motor vehicle
theft rate (MVTR).  However, as proposed in my
second hypothesis this relationship is positive.  The
relationship is almost the direct opposite of the unem-
ployment rate relationship, a deviation of one per-
centage point in the rate of change of unemployment
translates in approximately twenty-four more motor
vehicle thefts per 100,000 inhabitants.  This suggests
that people are in fact motivated by changes in the
unemployment rate from one period to the next.
A simulation of the model is helpful to under-
stand how a business cycle leads to changes in the
motor vehicle theft rate.  The equation to show how
fluctuations in unemployment impact the motor ve-
hicle theft rate using Illinois would read as follows:
(Eq. 3)
MVTR=726.287 – 22.097UNEMP +
23.651DUNEMP
An example using five percent unemployment
in year one with no change from the prior period, up
to six percent unemployment in year two, and steady
at six percent in year three projects motor vehicle
theft rates of 615.80, 617.36, and 593.71 respec-
tively.  This shows that as unemployment initially in-
Table 1: State Level Model
                               Adjusted R-squared = .705
CONSTANT 726.287
UNEMP** -22.097
(-3.741)
DUNEMP** 23.651
(2.578)
NJ** 95.348
(2.396)
NY** 110.258
(2.793)
GA** -105.499
(2.620)
MN** -308.223
(-7.439)
WI** -306.204
(-7.597)
MS** -305.750
(-7.677)
AZ** 86.126
(2.163)
UT** -326.863
(-7.960)
SD** -523.224
(-12.025)
*significant at the .1 level, **significant at the .05 level
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creases there is a marginal increase in MVTR.  How-
ever, as unemployment becomes stationary at a higher
cludes a time trend variable in addition to the model
seen in Table 1.  The results of this model, shown in
Table 2, are nearly identical to the results of the origi-
nal state-level model.
UNEMP and DUNEMP remain highly sig-
nificant, both satisfy the .05 level.  The new coeffi-
cients mirror the coefficients found in Table 1.  While
there is certainly a time trend, it does not follow the
time trend that would be expected to capture the ef-
fect of changing ownership rates.  In the first six out
seven years of the model, 1980-1986, the trend sug-
gests a decrease in the motor vehicle theft rate, while
at the same time motor vehicle ownership rates were
increasing.  This means that while there were pro-
gressively more “suitable victims” there was not a
noticeable increase in crime as a result.
While this model does not capture the effects
of changes in ownership rates in the 1980s or the
invention of affordable anti-theft devices in the mid
and late 90s, it does provide further support for the
findings of the original state level model.  The results
of the state level model offer many suggestions that
have not been captured at the national level.
V.  Conclusion and Implications
The results of this study suggest that some of
the focus on the economics of crime needs to be re-
directed from focusing solely on the supply of offend-
ers toward looking at the supply of victims.  Analo-
gously, labor economists study both the supply of la-
bor and the supply of jobs (known as the demand for
labor) and any economics study field would be in-
complete without reviewing both aspects.  The idea
of a negative unemployment-crime relationship is a
new theory and as such it calls for much closer in-
spection.  This study’s ability to repeatedly present a
significant relationship between unemployment and
motor vehicle theft is something that most of the re-
search focusing on the motivational aspect has been
unable to conclusively prove for the past half century.
Common theory in public policymaking is that
higher unemployment causes higher rates (Sedgwick,
1980).  While there is certainly a link between unem-
ployment and higher crime rates as shown through
the change in unemployment variable it does not have
the overriding impact that most theorists suggest.
Certainly one explanation as to why individuals are
not highly motivated to commit a criminal act shortly
after they are unemployed is the safety nets that our
society has installed to aid people through difficult
CONSTANT 704.31
UNEMP -21.212
(-1.985)
DUNEMP 29.555
(2.127)
NJ 96.705
(2.539)
NY 111.072
(3.002)
GA -104.135
(-2.625)
MN -306.618
(-7.064)
WI -304.924
(-7.659)
MS -306.689
(-8.027)
AZ 87.165
(2.284)
UT -329.917
(-7.716)
SD -520.716
(-10.497)
1980 -29.891
(-.495)
1981 -13.156
(-.230)
1982 -53.089
(-.775)
1983 -14.741
(-.220)
1984 3.743
(.058)
1985 -42.101
(-.739)
1986 -8.879
(-.157)
1987 2.558
(.046)
1988 33.933
(.619)
1989 71.375
(1.308)
1990 110.817
(2.021)
1991 109.223
(1.942)
1992 98.060
(1.727)
1993 96.402
(1.739)
1994 87.777
(1.610)
1995 77.259
(1.415)
1996 29.442
(.536)
1997 15.587
(.283)
1998 -41.909
(-.752)
1999 -74.413
(-1.321)
2000 -101.455
 (-1.741)
Table 3: State Level Model w/ Time Trend
Adjusted R-squared = .745
level MVTR drops considerably.  This example shows
how during periods of changing unemployment rates
the motivational effect dominates, while during peri-
ods of stationary unemployment levels the opportu-
nity effect dominates.
The final model that this study addresses in-
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times.  If these safety nets were to be removed, it is
plausible that individuals would be more motivated to
resort to criminal activity as a means of maintaining a
steady income.
It must also be noted that individual behavior
cannot be predicted by analysis at the macro level.
However, the findings of this study indicate a pattern
of behavior that has occurred over time and across
regions.  While individuals react differently to certain
situations, this study shows that the dominant pattern
is that the motivational effect, which has been so
widely touted, does not have as much influence in the
present as the opportunity effect.
This study also shows that the unit of obser-
vation plays a key role in determining the significance
of the attempt to understand patterns of individual
behavior.  The insignificance of both the unemploy-
ment rate and change in the unemployment rate in the
aggregate national level model compared with their
high significance in the cross-sectional level models
suggests that as the unit of observation decreases, the
relationship between unemployment and crime be-
comes more obvious.
The results of this study lend themselves to
numerous future research ideas.  One of the most
obvious areas that could be explained further is fixed
effects of each state.  As theory suggests there is cer-
tainly a relationship between population density, or
urbanization, and the level of crime in a given region.
However, examining Table 1 shows that it is not a
linear correlation between population density and the
“natural” level of crime.  There are numerous factors
that could potentially change the nature of a state’s
“average level of crime.”  Two factors that fit the theme
of this study are unemployment benefits and the du-
ration of unemployment, which both certainly vary
across states and over time.  Since I make the claim
that unemployment benefits help reduce an individual’s
motivation to commit a criminal act it would be help-
ful to support the assertion with data in future research.
Also, it would seem obvious that there would
be a relationship between motor vehicle ownership
rates (across region and over time) and motor vehicle
theft rates since a higher ownership rate suggests more
suitable victims.  This was not clearly picked up in the
time trend.  It is also possible that the inclusion of an
age variable would help explain some of the fluctua-
tions over time in the motor vehicle theft rate. As men-
tioned previously, the novelty of the opportunity per-
spective theory lends itself to much further research.
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